Craig M. Chambers and Linda C. Chambers v. Smithfield City And Robert Richardson : Brief of Appellant by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1983
Craig M. Chambers and Linda C. Chambers v.
Smithfield City And Robert Richardson : Brief of
Appellant
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.David R. Daines, Esq. and Christopher L. Daines, Esq.;
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Appellants
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Chambers v. Smithfield City, No. 19252 (1983).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4168
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CRAIG M. CHAMBERS and 
LINDA C. CHAMBERS, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. Supreme Court No. 19252 
SMITHFIELD CITY and 
ROBERT RICHARDSON, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
* * * * * 
Appeal from the Judgment of the First 
District Court of Cache County 
David R. Daines, Esq. 
Christopher L. Daines, Esq. 
DAINES & SMITH 
108 North Main, Suite 208 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants 
* * *·* * 
Steven R. Fuller, Esq. 
B. H. Harris, ~sq. 
HARRIS PRESTON GUTKE 
& CHAMBERS 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Respondent Smithfield City 
W. Scott Barrett, Esq. 
BARRETT & BRADY 
300 South Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Respondent Robert Richardson 
FILED 
SEP 2 71983 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Cl{AIG M. CHAMBERS and 
LINDA C. CHAMBERS, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
VS. 
SMITHFIELD CITY and 
ROBERT RICHARDSON, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Supreme Court No. 19252 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the First 
District Court of Cache County 
David R. Daines, Esq. 
Christopher L. Daines, Esq. 
DAINES & SMITH 
108 North Main, Suite 208 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants 
Steven R. Fuller, Esq. 
B. H. Harris, Esq. 
HARRIS PRESTON GUTKE 
& CHAMBERS 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Respondent Smithfield City 
W. Scott Barrett, Esq. 
BARRETT & BRADY 
300 South Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Respondent Robert Richardson 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED 
NATURE OF CASE 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
NATURE OF RELIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A (U ~ ,__, {\'\ ec Cv I 
POINT I 
THE CITY HAD NO AUTHORITY TO GRANT THE VARIANCE 
A. 
B. 
The Variance Violates the Spirit of the 
Ordinance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
There are No Special Circumstances 
Attached to the Property . . . . . 










From Any Unnecessary Difficulties and Hardships 13 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE PROCEDURE 
BY WHICH THE VARIANCE WAS GRANTED 16 
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 
- i -
CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED 
CASES 
Abel v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 
Conn., 374 A. 2d 227 (1977) ... 
Banks v. Kodiak Cit~ Council, 
Alaska 628 P.2d 9 7 (1981) 
Brown v. Fraser, 
Okl., 467 P.2d 464 (1970) . 
Erickson v. City of Portland, 




. 9. 13 
14 
6 
lvancovich v. City of Tuscon Board of Adjusters, 
- Ariz. App., 529 P.2d 242 (1975) . . . . . . 5, 9 
Levy v. Board of Adjustment of Arapehoe County, 
Colo., 369 P.2d 991 (1962). . . . . . . . . . 16 
Lovell v. Planning Com'n of City of Independence, 
Or. App., 586 P.2d 99 (1978). . . . . . . . 10 
Stice v. Gribben-Allen Motors, Inc., Parsons, 
Kan., 534 P. 2d 1267 (1975) ........ . 
Thurston v. Cache County, 
Utah, 626 P.2d 446 (1981) 
Topanga Ass'n For A Scenic Corrnnunity v. County 
of Los Angeles, 
Cal., 522 P.2d 12 (1974) ..... 
Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Com3any, 
97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724 (1938 .. 
STATUTES 
Section 10-9-6, Utah Code Annotated . 
Section 10-9-12, Utah Code Annotated 






.4, 6' 7' 
11, 12' 
13' 14. 17 
Section 10-9-15, Utah Code Annotated . . . . . . . . 18 
- ii -
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
1-:R,; I G M. CHAMBERS and 
l l NDA C CHAMBERS, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs Supreme Court No. 19252 
SMITHFIELD CITY and 
ROBERT RICHARDSON, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by Plaintiffs as agrieved parties 
for the plenary review of Defendant Smithfield City's decision 
granting Defendant Robert Richardson's variance request. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court denied Plaintiffs' motion for summary 
<Jruv\.ted 
judgment andlDefendants' motions for summary judgment, approving 
the variance and the procedure by which it was granted. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs/Appellants (hereinafter "Plaintiffs") 
seek a reversal of the lower court's summary judgment and remand 
with directions for entry of judgment in Plaintiffs' favor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Sometime prior to March of 1982, Defendant/Respondent 
Robert Richardson (hereinafter "Richardson") purchased a .67 acre 
lot located at approximately 380 South 200 West in Smithfield, 
Utah. Record p. 15 (hereinafter Record is denoted "R. "). 
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2. Prior to Richardson's purchase, the .67 acre lot 
was part of a one acre lot (R. 50) The prior owner divided 
the acre by selling the north 67 acre to Richardson (R. 47, 53 
3. The lot sold to Richardson (hereinafter "the prop-
erty") was and is located in an RE-1 zone, which requires a 
'l 
minimum area of one acre for building (R. 1, '11). The property 
is "restricted," (K. 20, 47, 50), in that a residence was alread· 
located on the balance of the original one acre lot when the 
subject .67 acre property was sold to Richardson (R. 46). 
4. At the time Richardson purchased the property, he 
was aware of the one acre minimum building requirement imposed 
by the RE-1 zone (R. 54). 
5. The RE-1 zone is a "buffer" zone between residentia. 
and agricultural zones (R. 40, 45, 53). The RE-1 zone allows 
for residential use (with one acre minimum lot required) and 
some animal use (R. 54) 
6. On March 11, 1982, Richardson proposed to Defendant 
Smithfield City (hereinafter "the City") that the property be 
rezoned from the RE-1 zone to an RE-1-12 zone to allow for con-
struction of a single family dwelling (R. 15, 78). Hearing on 
the application was held March 17, 1983 (R. 45), and on April 
7, 1982, Richardson withdrew his rezone application at the City's 
instruction (R. 47, 53). All of these proceedings were before 
the City's Planning and Zoning Commission (hereinafter "the 
Zoning Cornrnissiori). 
7. On April 15, 1982, Richardson applied to the City's 
Board of Adjustments (hereinafter "the Board") for a variance whic 
would allow him to build a residence on the property (R. 15, 16). 
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On May 27, 1982, the Board approved (three to one) Richardson's 
request (R. 16, 54). 
8. On June 16, 1982, Richardson applied to the Zoning 
Commission for an adjustment along the same lines as the one 
approved by the Board of Adjustments (R. 50). The Zoning Co=ission 
unanimously voted to "reco=end approval" of the application 
(R. 50). 
9. On June 23, 1982, Richardson presented the variance 
application to the City Council (R. 17). After considering the 
actions taken by the other two administrative bodies, the City 
Council voted three to two to approve the variance request (R. 40). 
10. The procedure followed by Richardson in obtaining 
approval for his variance request was required by and in compliance 
with the provisions in Chapter 4-2 of the Smithfield City Ordinances 
as amended by Ordinanace 1-85 (R. 17). 
11. All of the findings made by the Board, the Co=ission 
or the Council are contained in a "Findings of Fact" printed 
sheet with notations, which is found in the record at pages 57 
and 85. 
I. THE CITY HAD NO AUTHORITY TO GRANT THE VARIANCE. 
The threshold and primary substantive issue presented 
by this appeal is whether the board of adjustments was within its 
autho~ in approving Richardson's variance request. For pur-
poses of this point only, Plaintiffs treat the board of adjust-
ments as: having made the variance decision (See Point IIa below). 
If, as Plaintiffs claim and will show, the Board had no power 
to grant the variance, then the trial court erred in upholding 
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the variance and its summary judgment should be reversed by this 
Court. 
The powers of Municipal boards of adjustment are define 
in Section 10-9-12, Utah Code Annotated. Subsection 10-9-12(3) 
gives the board power to authorize variances only upon compliance 
with specified conditions. 
"The board of adjustments shall have the following 
powers: ... 
(3) To authorize upon appeal such variance from 
the terms of the ordinance as will not be contrary 
to the public interest, where owing to special con-
ditions a literal enforcement of the provisions of 
the ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship; 
provided that the spirit of the ordinance shall be 
observed and substantial justice done. Before any 
variance may be authorized, however, it shall be 
shown that: 
(a) The variance will not substantially affect 
the comprehensive plan of zoning in the City and 
that adherence to the strict letter of the ordinance 
will cause difficulties and hardships, the 
imposition of which upon the petitioner is un-
necessary in order to carry out the general pur-
pose of the plan. 
(b) Special circumstances attached to the prop-
erty covered by the application which do not 
generally apply to the other property in the same 
district. 
(c) That because special circumstances, property 
covered by the application is deprived of the 
privileges possessed by other properties in the 
same district; and that the granting of the variance 
is essential to the enjoyment of a substantial 
property right possessed by other property in the 
same district." 
Section 10-9-12, U.C.A. Since the City cannot, by ordinance, 
expand the powers granted in the enabling statute, Section 
10-9-12(3) defines the widest possible range of the board's 
discretion. Furthermore, the board lacks jurisdiction to grant 
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a variance request which fails to meet the minimum statutory 
requirements. See Ivancovich v. City of Tuscon Board of Adjust-
~ent, Ariz. App, 529 P.2d 242 at 247 (1975). 
A deficiency in any one of the minimum requirements of 
the statute deprives the board of power to grant a variance. For 
instance, if an applicant has demonstrated that strict adherence 
to the ordinance will create difficulties and hardships, but he 
fails to show any special circumstances attached to the property, 
the board cannot grant his request for a variance. 
In the present case, the board lacked authority to grant 
Richardson's request. The variance did not even meet one of the 
statutorily prescribed minimum tests, let alone all of them as 
required. There is no evidence to support the City's decision. 
See Points IA through IC. 
The City's lack of power to grant the variance 
translates into clear error on the part of the trial court. 
"We hold therefore that ... the order of the 
Board of Adjustment and the judgment of the 
District Court are both made without authority 
of law." 
Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Company, 97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724 
at 729 (1939). Plaintiffs submit that in reviewing the variance 
decisions of a board of adjustments, the district court should 
presume its decision to be "regular," and should uphold the 
decision of the board if there is "substantial evidence" to 
support it. See Banks v. Kodiak City Council, Alaska, 628 P.2d 
927 (1981). The same standard has been held to apply to appellate 
review of the lower court's ruling on the variance. 
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"In reviewing a district court's judgment, as 
above, this court wil 1, in the first instance 
.make the same review nf Lhe administrative 
tribunal's action as does the district court." 
Stice v. Gribben-Allen Motors, Inc., Parsons, Kan., 534 P.2d 126 
at 1271 (1975). 
The error of the trial court was compounded by the fact 
that in the proceedings before the City, Richardson had the bur~ 
of showing his entitlement to a variance. Erickson v. City of 
Portland, Or. App., 496 P.2d 726 (1972). In a typical variance 
case, the burden of proof shifts from the applicant before the 
board to the petitioner who seeks judicial relief. But in this 
case, thio trial court granted summary judgment in Defendants' 
favor. This Court must, therefore, construe the evidence in the 
light most favorable to Plaintiffs. 
The inevitable conclusion to be drawn from the record, 
no matter what standard of review is employed, is that the variar .. 
should not and could not have been granted, having failed to meet 
one or more of the statucory requisites. The trial court's 
summary judgment was likewise erroneous and was premature beside; 
A. The Variance Violates the Spirit of the Ordinance. 
The first and most important requirement the enabling 
act imposes on variance requests is "that the spirit of the 
ordinance shall be observed." Section 10-9-12(3), U.C.A. The 
idea that the variance cannot substantially deviate from the 
ordinance is also expressed in the statute as follows: the 
board has power to authorize "such variance from the terms of the 
ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest," 
Section 10-9-12(3), U.C.A.; and "the variance will not sub-
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.stantJally affect the comprehensive plan of zoning of the City," 
Sect-Lon 10-9-12(3) (a), The statute leaves the board of adjustment$ 
powerless to grant anything other than a minor deviation from the 
,;oning ordinance. The variance here granted constituted a 
significant departure from the zoning ordinance and should be 
struck down on this ground alone. 
In Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 
P.2d 724 (1939), the Utah Supreme Court declared a variance to 
be illegal as a substantial departure from the zoning ordinance. 
In the proceedings below both the Defendants and the Court 
distinguished the Walton case on the basis that Walton dealt with 
a "use variance," whereas the present case is an "area variance." 
Although the distinction exists, both "area" and "use" variances 
must meet the same statutory requirements; the statute makes no 
distinction between "use" and "area" variance. The proposition 
of Walton was that a variance in use is per se violative of the 
spirit of the ordinance, and as to the board of adjustments, 
is an ultra vires act. See Walton, 92 P.2d at 729. The basis 
for the holding, in part, was that the board could not, by 
variance, effect a rezone as zoning was a legislative function 
and the board was merely an administrative agency: 
"Any variance in use to the extent such land 1s 
in effect a rezoning or the placing of such 
land in a different zone than that in which 
the Commission by ordinance had placed it . 
Walton, P.2d at 727. 
The Walton case is helpful not only because it 
establishes some general guidelines as to what constitutes a 
violation of the spirit of the ordinance, but also because in 
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dicta, the court outlines the kind of "minor deviations" from 
the ordinances that are the prope1 subject of a variance. 
"Can the Board then grant a variance in use or 
is it confined to variances in building and con-
struction details within specified uses? ... If, 
however, the powers of the Board are limited to 
minor and practical difficulties, to such vari-
ations in detail and construction as the 
Inspector himself might have allowed rather than 
to use, the statute and set up are harmonious 
throughout. . and the purpose and spirit of 
zoning laws preserved. .And this interpretation 
of the statute is in accordance with the great 
weight of authority." , 
(f:'!}'IQi-1lGI~ w_ddt.d _) 
Walton, 92 P. 2d at 727. ' Variances are within the power of the 
Board <:?_~ if they concern building and construction details 
which the building inspector himself might waive. 
ln the present case, the variance permits Richardson 
to build a home on two thirds of an acre, where the minimum lot 
size is one acre. This is not a minor "detail" which the 
building inspector might overlook in granting a permit. This 
variance violates the spirit and purpose of the ordinance by 
in effect downzoning the lot from an RE-1 zone to a zone in which 
the same uses are permitted but the minimum lot size is reduced. 
The RE-1 zone is classified with reference to two major criteria, 
use and minimum lot size. The set back and yard requirements 
are not made part of the classification, because these matters 
are details. Where the only distinction between the Re:-1 zone 
and other zones is the minimum lot size, it cannot be said the 
minimum lot size is a minor "detail of construction." 
Plaintifb concede~ that if the applicant had conflictiR 
surveys with regard to lot size, or had 99 percent of an acre, 
a variance might not violate the spirit of the ordinance. But 
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here Richardson would have the board of adjustment lop off a full 
rh1rd of the minimum area required by the ordinance. 
"Un uestionabl the re uested variance from the 
... requirement that there bf a ot area of not 
less than 6,000 square feet ... so that this 
applicant might use this ... 3,000-square-foot 
lot for single-family dwelling purposes, would 
undul and in a ver marked de ree conflict"With 
t at speci ic provision o the or inance, an 
would be against the public interest as declared 
therein, as well as contrary to the spirit of the 





Cevvi p~\U~; s ULJda1_,,; 
Brown v. Fraser, Okl., 467 P.2d 464 at 469 (1970). 1 The elimination 
of one third of the lot requirement would likewise be contrary 
to the spirit of the ordinance. See Abel v. Zoning Board of 
Appeals, Conn., 374 A.2d 227 (1977). 
The "findings" of the Board are not helpful with regard 
to determining whether the spirit of the ordinance is maintained 
by the variance (R. 85). As pointed out below, the "findings" 
are merely a checklist. Findings ld through lg pay homage to 
the principle of preserving the spirit of the ordinance, but 
there is absolutely no evidence to support those findings. The 
only discussion of the spirit of the ordinance with regard to 
this variance was the objection which was repeatedly raised on 
the basis that the RE-1 zone was a "buffer zone" and that the 
allowance of higher residential density than one home per acre 
violated the spirit of such a "buffer" between agricultural 
and residential uses (R. 40, 45, 53). The "findings" were merely 
self serving conclusions of the various City bodies, and as such 
have little bearing on the issue. This Court must look past 
those conclusions and must independently examine the record to 
see if the spirit of the ordinance was violated. See Ivancovich 
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v. City of Tucson Board of Adjustment, Ariz., App. 529 P.2d 
242 (1975). The record discloses that the variance conflicts 
with the expressed intent ot the ordinance. 
That the spirit of che ordinance has been violated by 
the variance is demonstrated not only by the variance as compared 
to the ordinance, but also by the way in which the variance was 
approved. The record clearly reflects that the variance was 
employed as an improper substitute for rezoning. 
In Lovell v. Planning Com'n of City of Independence, 
Or. App., 586 P.2d 99 (1978), the Court struc~ down a variance 
wh1c], would have allowed construction on an area "less than the 
minimums specified for this R-1 single family residence zone." 
The Board had found that "(T)he degree of variance in this case 
is a reasonable amount of square footage for proper building." 
Lovell, a86 P.2d at 100. The Court implicitly found the variance 
to he in conflict with the zoning ordinance and directed the 
City's attention to the proper remedy: 
.if the City believes the lot size that 
would be left after the proposed partitioning 
is sufficient for its R-1 residential areas, 
then it should change its zoning restrictions 
to reflect that belief. Variances should 
not be employed as a substitute for the normal 
legislative process of amending zoning regulations." 
Lovell, 586 P.2d at 101. 
In the present case, Richardson began the process of 
obtaining approval for construction by requesting a rezone of hL 
lot. See Statement of Fact, paragraph 6. It is important to 
note that Richardson switched his approach to a variance procedu: 
only after the City convinoed him that a variance would accompli2 
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the same result, but with substantially less difficulty (R. 47). 
The City had apparently superimposed variance ("special questions") 
standards over certain types of rezone requests, which rendered 
variance requests procedurally and substantively less difficult 
in those "special questions" cases. This improper channelling 
of Richardson's rezone request into the variance procedure points 
out the substance of Richardson's request and the variance as 
granted: It constitutes a substantive amendment to the zoning 
ordinance as to that lot and as such is invalid. The City 
further revealed the rezone character of the request when the 
Planning and Zoning Commission stated: 
"It was felt this is a residential area 
and one home on .67 of an acrea was 
reasonable." (R. 50). 
If the City felt the area was residential and that .67 of an 
acre was a reasonable size for a lot in that area "then it should 
change its zoning restrictions to reflect that belief." Lovell, 
586 P.2d at 101. The variance, however, was not a proper remedy 
for Richardson and should be struck down. The district court 
erred in upholding the variance because the variance violates the 
public policy as expressed in the zoning ordinance. 
B. There Are No Special Circumstances Attached to the Property. 
Under the enabling act the subject property must be 
subject to special circumstances which are not generally attached 
to other property in the same district. Section 10-9-12(3)(b). 
This requirement is both indepndent and prerequisite to the 
"hardship" requirement. See Section 10-9-12(3)(c), U.C.A. 
In this respect the variance has no basis because 
1) there is no evidence of special circumstances attached to 
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Richardson's property and 2) there is no evidence of the 
difference between Richardson's property and other property in 
the RE-1 district The variance is therefore, illegal as this 
condition of the enabling act has not been satisfied. 
In the present case, the Board unanimously found that 
special circUlilstances attach to Richardson's property (R. 85, 
finding li). Plaintiffs are at a complete loss to fintl from the 
record any evidence to support the Board's finding. The trial 
court likewise failed to identify any evidence that supported the 
Board's findings. See R. 87-89. The clear import of Section 
10- 9-12 ( 3) ( c) , U. C. A omd the--±-ti-s-t- o.f--any--_..._V-idence w &upp=t- the 
~' s fi:n4ing-. The tr brl-c-ourt--i±kew±se---far~B-identi-fy 
-any ev-i4enee- tna_t_ supported- the £-ea-rcl-1-s- ftmtin-gs: See l0~9-t20J 
(-e-h-~A-: and the lack of any evidence of special circumstance, 
attached to the Richardson property obviate the necessity of 
further citation. 
Even if Richardson had carried his burden of 
demonstrating some "special circumstances" attached to his 
property, he would not have satisfied the statutory requirement 
"The data contained in the planning commission's 
report focus almost exclusively on the qualities 
of the property for which the variance was sought. 
In the absence of comparative information about 
surrounding properties, these data lack legal 
significance. 
Thus neither an administrative agency nor a reviewing 
court may assume without evidentiary basis that the 
character of neighboring property is different 
from that of the land for which the variance is 
sought." 
- 13 -
lopanga Ass'n For A Scenic Corrnnunity v. County of Los Angeles, 
l1C)74) 
C:al , 522 P.2d 12 at 21, 22. Again, the record is completely 
tlevoul of evidence of the circumstances attached to the 
~11.rrounding property. It should be noted here that the sub-
to-\-
standard size of Richardson's is not a special circumstance 
within the meaning of Section 10-9-12(3) (c). The lot is no 
different than other substandard lots in the same zone. See 
Brown v. Fraser, Okl., 467 P.2d 464 at 469 (1970). 
Having failed to bring forward any evidence of special 
circumstances of the property which distinguish it from ot':i.er 
parcels in the same district, Richardson must be denied the 
variance which the City and the lower court granted him in 
contradiction with the statute. 
C. The Variance Does Not Relieve Richardson From Any 
Unnecessary Difficulties and Hardships. 
Under Utah law, in order for a variance to be granted, 
it must be shown that: 
" ... Adherence to the strict letter of the 
ordinance will cause difficulties and hard-
ships, the imposition of which upon the 
petitioner is unnecessary in order to carry 
out the general purpose of the plan." 
Section 10-9-12(3)(a), U.C.A. Subsection (3)(c) of the same 
section restates this basic principle in terms of the preser-
vation of a "substantial property right." In this case, no 
difficulties have been shown. There is no evidence of "hard-
ships." There is nothing in the record to support the finding 
that "deprivation" of property rights has resulted from special 
circumstances. 
The applicant has the burden of showing that any 
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unnecessary difficulties and hardships would occur to him if the 
ordinance were literally enforced Brown v. Fraser, Okl., 467 
P.2d 464 (1970). In the proceedings below, Defendants argued 
that their burden had been met by what they claimed was proof 
of "practical difficulties." They urged upon the trial court th, 
"practical difficulties" standard based on their contention tha~ 
such standard is appropriate in "area variance" cases. The 
language of the statute, however, establishes the standard to be 
'~'"'-\ u,...\•. ', 
"difficulties and hardships," Section 10-9-12(3)(a), U.C.A}, and 
makes no distinction between "area" and "use" variances. Given 
the ruling in Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 
P. 2d 724 ( 1939), that "use" variances are per se illegal as 
rezoning by a non-legislative body, the remaining standards of 
enabling statute, including "difficulties and hardships," can 
only apply to what Defendants characterize as "area" variances. 
This Court should flatly reject the "practical difficulties" 
standard and adopt the "unnecessary hardship" and "difficulties 
and hardships" standards contained in the clear langua3e of 
Section 10-9-12(3), U.C.A. 
Although the Board made a finding of "hardship," (See 
R. 85, lh and lj) and the court found that the land would be 
rendered useless without the variance (R. 83) , there is no 
evidence of a cognizable "difficulty" or "hardship" which 
Richardson might suffer. The RE-1 zone permits some animal 
uses on the land (See Findings of Fact 5), and the land was 
apparently so employed prior to Richardson's purchase (R. 46). 
Nothing in the record suggests Richardson can't use his lot 
without a home on it. 
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The Corrnnission and the Court apparently assumed the 
z.oning restriction might impair or reduce the value of Richardson's 
lot. Although nothing contained in the record justifies this 
speculation, Plaintiffs will admit, for purposes of argument, that 
rhe variance would enhance the value of the lot. That fact, 
even if shown, would not constitute a "hardship." 
"Although we have not had prior occasion to 
construe our variance statute, it is of a 
variety commonly found in other states. A 
finding of unnecessary hardship or the 
equivalent is universally required, and the 
universal rule is that the financial loss or 
the potential financial advantage to the 
applicant is not the proper basis for a 
variance." (citations omitted). 
Stice v. Gribben-Allen Motor, Inc., Parsons, Kan., 534 P. 2d 
1267 at 1272 (1875). There is no evidence that lacking the 
variance Richardson would suffer any "difficulty" or "hardship." 
The trial Court therefore erred in granting summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs additionally claim that even if Richardson 
had carried his burden of proving "unnecessary hardship," the 
variance would be improper under the doctrine of "self-created 
hardsip"~~- Although this doctrine is not expressly 
made part of the statute, most Courts read into the variance 
proceedings this additional consideration. The Smithfield City 
ordinance apparently contemplates application of the "self-
created hardship" doctrine in variance cases, as evidenced by 
"finding" lk (R. 85). Defendants argued, and the trial court 
agreed, that the self-created hardship doctrine was inapplicable 
because Richardson did not "create" the hardship (R. 83). The 
"self-created hardship" doctrine is properly applied, however, 
where the alleged "hardship" is voluntarily acquired: 
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"As was mentioned above, the Board denied Levy's 
request for a variance on the ground that Levy's 
hardship, if any, was "self-inflicted" in that 
she purchased the subject property consisting of 
only one and one-quarter acres, with either 
actual or constructive nolice that existing 
zoning regulations required that a single family 
residence be built on no less than two and one-
half acres. 
Without deciding whether 'self-inflicted hardship' 
is in and of itself an absolute J.ar to the 
granting of a variance, it is at the very least 
a highly significant fact which. . is a 'material 
element bearing on the issue and weighs heavily 
against the owner seeking the variance.'" 
Levy v. Board of Adjustment of Arapehoe County, Colo., 369 P.2d 
(1%L) 
991. In the present case, the finding of the.Board and the Cour: 
that the "self-created hardship" doctrine did not apply was not 
only unsupported by the evidence, but was directly contrary to 
the evidence in the record (See Finding of Fact 4). 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE PROCEDURE BY 
WHICH THE VARIANCE WAS GRANTED. 
Pursuant to Smithfield City Ordinance, a variance reques 
is submitted for "recorrnnendation" to the Board of Adjustments and 
the Planning & Zoning Commission. The ordinance purports to vest 
the City Council with authority to grant variances in appropriate 
cases after the "recommendations" have been made by the other 
two principal agencies (R. 25). This procedure is not allowed 
under Section 10-9-12, U.C.A. This Court should declare Smithfie: 
City Ordinance 4-2-d.6 to be invalid as conflicting with the 
enabling statute. The Smithfield City procedure contradicts 
the enabling act in that it bestows upon the City Council the 
ultimate decision-making power with regard to variances. 
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Defendants and the trial court relied heavily upon 
Thurston v. Cache County, Utah, 626 P,2d 446 (1981) to support 
their view that the Smithfield procedure comports with the 
enabling act. Their reliance is misplaced because in Thurston 
this Court addressed a different enabling statute (county as 
opposed to city), and an entirely distinct procedure (conditional 
use permit as opposed to variance). Plaintiffs agree that a 
County may, by ordinance, reserve to its legislative body the 
power to grant conditional use permits. This does not mean, 
however, that a City may, by ordinance, reserve to its legislative 
body the power to grant variances. 
In the present case, the enabling statute gives to the 
Board of Adjustments the power to grant variances. See Section 
10-9-12(3). The power to grant variances is given to no other 
municipal body. This power is not made dependent upon the 
legislative body "optional" provisions for the Board's exercise 
of its power as was the case in Thurston. See Thurston, 626 
P.2d at 445, 446. That the Board of Adjustments is the only 
body invested with the power to grant variances "is clear 
from the statutory language." 
This principle is not only clear from the statute, 
rt is implicit in the entire framework of municipal zoning. 
First, the Enabling Statute requires that municipalities 
who wish to avail themselves of zoning powers create a Board 
of Adjustments. Section 10-9-6, U.C.A. If the Board were totally 
dependent upon municipal ordinances to determine when it had 
the powers ostensibly given by state law, the requirement that 
cities have such boards would be rendered meaningless. 
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Second, the zoning system established by the Enabling 
Act contemplates a Board c,f AdjustmenL which sits as an appellat, 
body within the rnunic:cpality. The Smithfield Ordinance creates 
the untenable situation where an appeal to the Board would be 
taken from a decision which the Board had already recommended 
and approved. 
Third. :he Smithfield Ordinance places one who seeks 
judicial review of a variance in a "catch 22" dilemma. Section 
10-9-15, Utah Code Annotated provides for appeal from the Board's 
J~~i•i0n within 30 days. By the time the Board's decision is ma~ 
-:i11a_ (by the City Council) it is likely the time for appeal has 
passed. But if judicial review is sought irmnediately after the 
Board passes on the variance, the argument might well be raised 
that such review is premature as the City Council could deny 
the variance. 
Finally, Plaintiffs contend the Smithfield Ordinance 
as now constituted lacks adequate provisions for notice. The 
Defendants' ~nd the Court's response to this contention is that 
Plaintiffs received actual notice of the proceedings and that 
their interests were represented at the administrative hearings. 
Although Plaintiffs agree that lack of notice may have been 
"cured" in this case. the deficiencies in the notice point to 
the ordinance's overall lack of compliance with statutory 
requirements. 
The Smithfield ordinance creates a variance procedure 
which is disjointed, unnecessarilv repetitive and confusing. 
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:i.bove all, the procedure is contrary to the guidelines and 
1.oning framework mandated by the Utah State Legislature. The 
c•rdinance should therefore be struck down by this Court, the 
DLstrict Court having failed to do so by its ruling on the parties' 
motions for surmnary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Smithfield City erred in granting Richardson's variance 
request. The variance violated the spirit of the zoning ordinance 
and constituted a rezoning in variance clothing. There was no 
showing that Richardson's property had special circumstances or 
that his property was any different than the surrounding property. 
There was no showing that Richardson suffered any hardships or 
difficulties before the variance was granted. The District 
Court erred in refusing to grant Plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment because there were no facts in the record to 
support Defendants' position. Likewise, the lower court erred 
in granting summary judgment for Defendants. Finally, the 
procedure employed by Smithfield City in variance~ cases is so 
contrary to the enabling statute that it must be struck down, the 
Thurston case notwithstanding. For all of the above reasons 
this Court should reverse and remand to the District Court with 
directions to vacate the variance. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of September, 1983. 
DAINES & SMITH 
~l~  L. Daines s= 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellants 
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